ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLICATION ON NATIONAL SECURITY IN KENYA: A CASE OF HOMEGROWN RADICAL GROUPS IN NAIROBI COUNTY

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ABSTRACT

This study attempts to illustrate the possible causatives of terrorism that is home-grown that generally concerns the public and the policy makers of Kenya. The notion that every terror attack aims at striking fear on Kenyan and foreign nationals can just be the sole shared denominator. The purpose of this study was to identify the socio-economic factors that influence international radicalization on Kenyan youths in to enable early interventions. The target area is Kenya's capital Nairobi which has emerged as a major radicalisation hub for international and domestic terror cells in the last ten years. This research was descriptive research design where the data was collected from the respondents as it occurs in the population using a questionnaire. The study targeted 210 individuals. The study concluded that Some of the social factors include level of education, social identification and network dynamics. We have seen that people are being recruited via social media sites, which are Facebook and twitter. Internet pursues a huge part in increment of radicalization. Environments of work, education institutions, faith-based organizations, prisons, internet and also families contribute to radicalization of these youths. Majority of the unemployed youths tend to be indoctrinated into radicalization because they are idle and they have nothing to do. Economic factors that bring about terrorism include economic deprivation and poverty. Social factors for instance network dynamics and social identification bring about radicalization. Identification with social groups is a particularly accurate predictor of social behavior and is, as such, probably one of the most important intervening factors at the social level. The study recommendations were that there happens to be a necessity of reforming education on religions to adopt reasonable religion, and training the members of the clergy in order to promote reliable religious values. The clerics of Islam are supposed to work in conjunction with the state towards combating radicalization of religion and intense extremism of youths. The security agents should put measures to ensure increased public participation in countering terrorism. This is going to open doors to security agencies for interacting with the civilians and developing a good relationship thus understanding and gaining more insight concerning that community and efficiently gathering intelligence.

Key words: *Implication on National Security, Socio-Economic Factors, International Radicalization*

INTRODUCTION

This study looked at the implication of home-grown terrorism on national security in Nairobi County in Kenya. I chose Nairobi County in Kenya because as Kenya's capital, it has borne the brunt of acts of terror. In the last 20 years, more than 200 Kenyan and foreign nationals have lost their lives as a result of terror attacks in Nairobi alone. Data from foreign and local law enforcement indicates a majority of the perpetrators of terrorism have origins from Nairobi, specifically the sprawling slums of Eastliegh, Majengo and Kibra. Home-grown terrorism has been rampant in the country and needs to be combated in all ways possible so as to ensure that the country is free of acts of terror. This proposal covers the study background, problem statement, research questions, objectives and hypothesis, literature review, study justification, theoretical framework and research methodology.

Objective

To identify the socio-economic factors that influence international radicalization on Kenyan youths in to enable early interventions.

Statement of the Problem

The recurrence of the terror attacks in the capital on of Kenya from 1998, the increase in radicalization and the rising extreme violence has brought fresh ideas to Kenya's public debate. These include 'home-grown terrorism' and 'radicalisation' (Seesemann, 2007). This implies that future threats are not going to come from countries that are far from Kenya, but from the domestic and citizens who are well-integrated. This led to elusive and pressing challenges to the security agencies and policy makers who are yet to unravel the scope and causes of radicalization from an international perspective. Therefore, it's necessary to comprehend what motivates Kenyan youth to venture into international extremist ideologies.

Silber, M. D contends that while Al Qaeda threat persists, terror attacks contrary to Kenyan targets are abstracted and planned by the locals using Al Qaeda as the motivation and reference point of their ideologies. He then contends that there has been an emergence of a fresh threat, denoting to mixed groups which are unscrupulous and have the capacity of rapidly transforming themselves overnight. Their unique nature indicates they don't have rigid and formal structures. Contrary to that, they are volatile, liquid or fluid. They then suggest that the era we are living in is denoted by effect of lethal types of crime, transnational and organized crime, and as well 'home-grown' and imported terrorism, and insurgency which is executed by the Kenyan nationals.

Social Movement Theory

According to Ralph Tuner and John Brown, social movement is a loosely organized but sustained campaign in support of a social goal, typically either the implementation or the prevention of a change in society's structure or values. Although social movements differ in size, they are all essentially collective. That is, they result from the more or less spontaneous coming together of people whose relationships are not defined by rules and procedures but who merely share a common outlook on society.

Collective behaviour are guided largely by impulse. When short-lived impulses give way to long-term aims, and when sustained association takes the place of situational groupings of

people, the result is a social movement. Therefore, social movement is not merely a perpetuated crowd, since a crowd does not possess organizational and motivational mechanisms capable of sustaining membership through periods of inaction and waiting. Furthermore, crowd mechanisms cannot be used to achieve communication and coordination of activity over a wide area, such as a nation or continent. A movement is a mixture of organization and spontaneity. There is usually one or more organizations that give identity, leadership, and coordination to the movement, but the boundaries of the movement are never coterminous with the organizations. For example, although organizations such as California's Sierra Club are influential in the movement to preserve the natural environment, anyone who works for the cause and interacts with other workers for this purpose is a member of the conservationist movement. The famous John Brown was not a member of any major abolitionist organization, but his martyrdom made him a leader and symbol for the movement, even though organizational leaders were reluctant to recognize him.

The social movement theory is one of the theories applied to understanding radicalization processes and violent extremism. Social movement theory demonstrates how ideologies may develop a life of their own that transcends the boundaries of any particular group. It also helps to emphasize the importance of the process, not just transformation, including critical distinctions that may exist between the processes underlying one's entry into a movement and those driving the nature and level of participation. Zald and McCarthy,1977 define a social movement's radicalization into violent extremism. Viewing contemporary extremist militancy as a global social movement, as a number of analysts have suggested, permits a different conceptualization of the problem with several potential insights for understanding the radicalization process. First, it provides the framework of mobilization potential to consider the process by which a movement's human resources are developed and to better understand how different people with the same set of beliefs come to assume different roles and take different kinds of actions.

Methods and Procedures
Descriptive research design was used in preliminary and exploratory studies to allow researchers to gather information, (Black, 2010). summarize, present and interpret for the purpose of clarification. According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2003), descriptive survey design is a process of collecting data in order to test hypothesis or to answer the questions of the current status of the subject under study.
The study was conducted in Eastleigh, Majengo and Kibra in Nairobi County. The sites have been selected bearing in mind the trend of radicalisation. The coverage is intended to provide broad perspective and a triangulation that illustrates various factors that motivate radicalisation. The study also track key extremist websites and chat forums sites in the internet such as those propagated by Al Shabaab and for a period of three months to provide insights.
The study used purposeful sampling to pick those who in the area of study use snowball technique through the local administrators and Non-Government Organisation to identify the targeted individuals who will participate in the research (Mugenda and Mugenda, 2003). According to Black (2010), purposive sampling is a non-probability sampling method and is appropriate when elements selected for the sample are chosen by the judgment of the researcher.

The study targeted 210 individuals. Out of the 210 respondents targeted, 150 filled and returned their questionnaires.

Findings and Discussion

How intelligence/anti-terrorism security agencies, Police and Community work together

The study sought to establish a link between community sentiments and the manner in which public law enforcement agencies translate counterterrorism & radicalization policy and strategy into practice. The study therefore found that majority of the respondents reported that sometimes the police & counterterrorism agencies consider their community's views when making decisions about addressing terrorism at the policy formulation and implementation stage.

Consideration of community's views

**Figure 1: Police considering the community view**

The Figure above shows that majority (35.75%) of respondents reported that sometimes the police & counter-antiterrorism agencies consider their community views when making decision about addressing radicalization & terrorism. The findings also show that 24.55% indicated that it frequently considers, 23.16% a little while 16.54 not much at all. While quoting the Minister of Internal Security opening remarks during the launching of the NSCVE at State House Nairobi in September 2016 thus "reflecting its public focus, this strategy has been developed through an inclusive, consultative process involving government agencies and county governments, religious leaders, civil society, the private sector, the research community, and regional and international partners" (NSCVE, 2016). This affirms the government's commitment to continually engage the public and other stakeholders in fighting the scourge of violent extremism, terrorism & radicalization and which is reflected by the results of the study.

The findings show that most of community members are very likely to report when they overheard people planning to plant explosives in terror attack. While some are somewhat unlikely to report to the police when they see a person reading a religious literature believed to be extremist, a person giving money to the organization that people say it is associated to terrorism and a person saying that he is travelling overseas to fight for Muslims. This underlines the suspicion and the general lack of trust in the police by the community members attributed to

their way of handling terrorism & radicalization activities or the community's belief that it is only a police responsibility to fight terrorism.

Collaboration and Information Sharing

The study also established that in areas where the community tended to trust the security agencies more, their likelihood of reporting suspicious activity was always higher and vice versa. The study also established that by sharing information about terrorist behaviors and activities, communities enable the security & anti-terrorism agencies to take appropriate and immediate action when suspicious behaviour is observed.

Figure 2: Honor the police summon to help in the investigation

42.06% of total population sampled reported that they are somewhat unlikely to honor a summon to the police station to assist in the investigation. While 33.8% were very likely, 12.71% were very unlikely. The findings also reveal that 11.44% were somewhat likely to honor summon as presented in the Figure 2 above.

Several studies on radicalization & countering terrorism have hypothesized an instrumental mechanism whereby people assess and act on the basis of net expected benefits or costs from cooperation with the law (Huq et al., 2011). The procedural justice model also supports this view and postulates that people respond to the belief that police & security agencies are a legitimate authority, which is a function of the fairness and procedural justice of police procedures in formulating and implementing policies (Tyler and Huq, 2002). The counter-terrorism agencies officers indicated that there was a need to develop nationally agreed standards for officers and government staff in fighting terrorism. This could be done through empowerment of communities, private sector and business community in order to have directed efforts in fighting against terrorism. The agencies and local administrators blamed incoherent policies that exist between the various agencies for the lack of the uncoordinated strategy in fighting radicalization & terrorism.

Reporting suspicious activities

The researcher also found out that most community members were likely to work with the anti-terrorism agencies and police in educating people in their communities about the dangers of terrorism and terrorist acts. The study also found out that majority of the community members reported that they were very likely to encourage the members of the public to generally

cooperate with the security agencies in an effort to fight terrorism. The findings further indicate that most respondents are likely to go to the police if they see any suspicious terror related activity in the community.

The findings show that most of community members are very likely to report when they overheard people planning to plant explosives in terror attack. While some are somewhat unlikely to report to the security agencies when they see a person reading a religious literature believed to be extremist, a person giving money to the organization that people say it is associated to terrorism and a person saying that he is travelling overseas to fight for Muslims. This underlines the suspicion and the general lack of trust in the police by the community members attributed to their way of handling terrorism activities or the community's belief that it is only police, anti-terrorism agency or local administrator responsibility to fight terrorism.

Figure 3: Reporting suspicious terror related activities

The Figure above shows that majority (37.77%) of respondents indicated that they were somewhat likely to go to the security agencies if they see any dangerous terror related activity going in the community. The Figure also shows that 31.81% were somewhat unlikely to report while 13.18% were very unlikely.

Table 1: How likely the respondents will report terror related activities to the police

	Very Unlikely	Somewhat Unlikely	Somewhat Likely	Very Likely
A person overheard discussion about decision to help plant explosives in terror attack	14.3%	28.1%	19.9%	37.6%
A person reading a religious literature believed to be extremist	21.5%	32.3%	27.2%	18.9%
A person giving money to the organization that people say it is associated to terrorism	11.8%	44.1%	36.8%	7.4%

A person saying that he is travelling overseas to fight for Muslims	15.2%	43.1%	11.9%	29.8%

The above table indicates the respondent's level of likeliness concerning statements based on the reporting any terror activities to the security agencies whereby 37.6% reported that they were very likely to report when they overheard discussion their decision to help plant explosives in terror attack. The findings also show that (32.3%, 44.1% and 43.1%) of respondents indicated that are somewhat unlikely to report to the security agencies when they see a person reading a religious literature believed to be extremist, a person giving money to the organization that people say it is associated to terrorism and a person saying that he is travelling overseas to fight for Muslims respectively.

From the data presented, it is clear that both the fairness of the procedure by which government forms anti-terror policing policies and implements such polices are implemented shape communities' attitudes towards the security agencies involved in counterterrorism and ultimately on cooperation in as far as educating other community members, reporting of suspicious activities and assisting in investigations are concerned.

Majority of the officers indicated that members of the public view the security agencies with suspicion, which strains the work relation between the officers and the public. Community leaders welcomed the initiative by the police to share information on imminent terrorist threats and how the community can collaborate by sharing information but cited the problem of being treated as a suspect whenever they report suspicious activities. One stated "*we want to support the police in dealing with crime and terrorism but we get arrested whenever we report anything to the police and held as suspects*". The officers suggested that more interaction through various activities between the security agencies and the public should be encouraged to eliminate the suspicion.

Table 2: Decision by Security Agencies

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
The security agencies are the legitimate authority and you should obey their decision	9.4%	57.1%	20.8%	12.7%
Agreeing with the decisions made by the police officer, even when you disagree with them	22.3%	33.9%	35.9%	7.9%
You trust the police officers to make decisions that are good for everyone when they are investigating and prosecuting terrorism	12.6%	30.0%	42.7%	14.6%

From the Table above, majority (57.1%) of community members agreed that the security and anti-terrorism agencies are legitimate authority and they should obey their decisions. The findings also show that (35.9% and 42.7%) of participants disagreed with the decisions made by

the agencies but trust that the agencies will make decisions that are good for everyone when they are investigating and prosecuting terrorism respectively. According to the process-based model of regulation, the quality of treatment one receives from legal authorities leads to viewing them as more legitimate and thus being more likely to obey and cooperate. This stems from the trust cultivated by the security agencies both at individual and institutional level.

CONCLUSION

Some of the social factors include level of education, social identification and network dynamics. We have seen that people are being recruited via social media sites, which are Facebook and twitter. Internet pursues a huge part in increment of radicalization. Environments of work, education institutions, faith-based organizations, prisons, internet and also families contribute to radicalization of these youths. Majority of the unemployed youths tend to be indoctrinated into radicalization because they are idle and they have nothing to do. Economic factors that bring about terrorism include economic deprivation and poverty. Social factors for instance network dynamics and social identification bring about radicalization. Identification with social groups is a particularly accurate predictor of social behavior and is, as such, probably one of the most important intervening factors at the social level.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To begin with, the study recommends that there happens to be a necessity of reforming education on religions to adopt reasonable religion, and training the members of the clergy in order to promote reliable religious values. The clerics of Islam are supposed to work in conjunction with the state towards combating radicalization of religion and intense extremism of youths in the Muslim communities that are probably key targets in being recruited by the extremists and the terrorists.

The study also recommends that; the security agents should put measures to ensure increased public participation in countering terrorism. This is going to open doors to security agencies for interacting with the civilians and developing a good relationship thus understanding and gaining more insight concerning that community and efficiently gathering intelligence.

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